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DEDUCTING HIGH-TECHNOLOGY START-UP
EXPENDITURES
Michael D. Rashkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the world of high-technology, a "start-up" is a new business
venture in the beginning stages of development which has not yet
reached the point where there is any degree of certainty that the
business will survive. There is no bright line that defines when a
business passes from its start-up phase to becoming a self-sustaining
enterprise. Ordinarily, this is not very troublesome as there is no
critical business need to precisely classify a business as being in its
start-up phase or as being in some other stage of business
development.
In the tax world, however, it is important to determine
whether a company is a start-up. Under recent case law and legisla-
tive developments, start-up expenses receive much less favorable
treatment than expenses incurred after the start-up phase has
passed. Section 195 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541, as
amended by the Tax Reform Act of 19842, provides that expendi-
tures incurred in investigating and creating a new active trade or
business are nondeductible start-up expenditures. Such expenses
may be amortized under section 195(b) over a period of not less
than sixty months, beginning after the start-up phase has ended.
Similar treatment is provided for corporate and partnership organi-
zational expenses under sections 248 and 709.
An important exception to the general rule of non-deductibility
involves research and experimental expenditures, which may be de-
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ducted on a current basis under section 174 even during the start-up
phase.
The deductibility of start-up expenditures has a direct impact
on the cost of and the return on an investment, and there has been
much judicial and legislative activity concerning the duration of the
start-up period. The prevailing judicial rule is that the start-up pe-
riod ends when a business has reached the stage of development
where it is ready to generate revenue. Thus, a new business with
nominal sales and large net losses will not be considered a start-up
even if there is little certainty that sales will eventually increase to
provide economic viability. If a business has no sales, however, it
will be considered a start-up even if there is no fundamental differ-
ence in its economic and business position.
The doctrine that prevents start-ups from deducting current
expenditures puts them at a disadvantage with respect to businesses
already in existence. A retail computer store chain can deduct the
start-up expenses of putting a store in a new geographic location,
but an entrepreneur who decides to begin his first retail computer
store cannot deduct any business expenses until the store opens its
doors to customers. It is unclear from case law and legislative his-
tory why tax policy has developed in this manner so as to create the
inconsistencies inherent in application of the current rules.
It is also unclear whether the judicial rule preventing deduc-
tion of business expenses until revenue is generated is founded on
correct tax principles. There has been conflicting case law on the
subject and even certain tax regulations leave doubt as to what is
the correct rule. In a recent case,3 the court of claims stated that it
cannot be Congress' intent to disallow recurrent business expenses
during the period prior to revenue generation. Legislative history of
the amendments to section 195 enacted by the Tax Reform Act of
1984, however, indicates that Congress intended to overrule this
case.
4
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress delegated its respon-
sibility for determining the start-up period by authorizing the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") to specify in
regulations when an active trade or business begins. Expenses in-
curred after an active trade or business begins are not considered
start-up expenses and are deductible under general rules. However,
3. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
4. STAFF OF THE JoINT COMMII-rEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG. 2d SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAx REFORM AcT OF 1984, 295-97 (Joint Comm. Print 1984) [here-
inafter cited as "General Explanation of the 1984 Act"].
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the Commissioner is not completely unfettered. The legislative his-
tory of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 indicates that it was not Con-
gress' intent to change the definition of start-up expenses from
current law. Therefore, the Commissioner will have to consider
current case law in defining the start-up period.
The problems regarding deductibility of start-up expenses af-
fect not only incipient businesses but existing businesses which want
to increase the scope of their activities. The issue in such cases is
whether the new activity represents an expansion of a current busi-
ness, which most courts hold is not a start-up activity, or whether
the new activity represents the beginning of a new trade or business,
which most courts treat as a start-up activity subject to the same
rules as new businesses. Existing businesses seeking to increase the
scope of their activities also encounter problems if a different legal
entity is used in implementing their growth plans. In dealing with
start-up expenses, courts have looked at each legal entity separately
and have not attributed the activities of the owners to the new en-
tity. Thus, if a computer retail chain incorporates each new store it
opens, the start-up expenses of each of these stores will not cur-
rently be deductible even though, on a consolidated basis, the incor-
porated store merely represents an expansion of the chain's business
rather than the start-up of new businesses.
Part II of this article will discuss the statutory rules dealing
with start-up expenditures. Part III will examine how the courts
have interpreted these rules, and Part IV will analyze the impact of
the newly amended section 195. Finally, Part V will offer some
conclusions and suggestions in dealing with the murky subject of
start-up expenses.
II. THE STATUTORY PUZZLE
No one section of the Code covers the various forms of start-up
expenditures incurred by a business. The following discussion will
identify and explain the operation of different sections of the Code
as they affect start-up expenditures.
A. Capital Expenditures Under Section 263
The initial obstacle to be overcome in deducting start-up ex-
penses is section 263. Section 263(a) provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.-No deduction shall be allowed for-
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent
improvements of betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate ....
1986]
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(2) Any amount expended in restoring property or in making
good the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has
been made.
Section 263 expresses one of the fundamental principles of tax law:
a capital expenditure is not deductible. Section 263 takes prece-
dence over other sections of the Code allowing business deductions,
so that even if a deduction is authorized under section 162, such
expenditure will not be deductible if section 263 applies.
B. Business Expenses Under Section 162
If a general business expenditure is not capital in nature it may
be deductible under section 162. Section 162(a) provides that there
shall be allowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business. Since busi-
ness deductions are allowable under section 162 only after a tax-
payer has begun carrying on a trade or business, an important date
for a business is the date it commences carrying on a trade or busi-
ness. This determination is made difficult by the fact that the term
"trade or business" is not defined in the Code or Regulations, and
there is no precise judicial definition of the term.5
C. Start-Up Expenditures Under Section 195
The controversy which developed over the deductibility of
start-up expenditures caused Congress to intervene and attempt to
resolve uncertainties. Congress decided to treat start-up expendi-
tures as capital expenditures and enacted section 195(a) which pro-
vides that "start-up expenditures" incurred in creating or acquiring
an active trade or business are not deductible. "Start-up expendi-
tures" are defined as noncapital expenditures incurred after a tax-
payer has decided upon acquiring a particular business and prior to
the beginning of an active trade or business. Section 195(b) permits
the amortization of start-up expenses over a period of not less than
sixty months beginning the month the active trade or business be-
gins. Although the Commissioner is given authority to specify
under regulations when an active trade or business begins, it is still
unclear as to where the Commissioner should draw the line. Thus,
5. 1 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs 20.1.2
(1981). There have been some imprecise definitions of the term "trade or business." Flint v.
Stone, 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911) ("'Business' is a very comprehensive term and embraces
everything about which a person can be employed."); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499
(1940) (Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion: carrying on any trade or business "in-
volves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services.")
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much of the uncertainty that existed prior to the enactment of sec-
tion 195 still remains. Research expenditures, interest and taxes are
specifically excluded from the scope of section 195 and are treated
under the provisions specifically dealing with those expenditures.
D. Expense for Production of Income Under Section 212
Section 212 provides that in the case of an individual, a deduc-
tion is allowed for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
for the production or collection of income, or for the management,
conservation or maintenance of the property held for the produc-
tion of income.6 Section 212 does not contain a trade or business
requirement as does section 162, but it has been held to require a
proprietary interest in property. Investigatory expenditures have
been disallowed as deductions under section 212 because they relate
to the acquisition or finding of income producing property rather
than the production of income from, or the management and main-
tenance of existing property.7
E. Research and Experimental Expenditures
Under Section 174
Section 174(a) allows a taxpayer to elect to expense or to amor-
tize research and experimental expenditures which are paid or in-
curred "in connection with his trade or business." The United
States Supreme Court in Snow v. Commissioner' held that the "in
connection" language of the statute represents an intent by Con-
gress to require a lesser degree of business activity than is required
under section 162, but the Court did not establish any test to differ-
entiate "in connection" activity from "carrying on" activity.9
F. Depreciation Deductions Under Section 167
A start-up business will generally acquire and create tangible
and intangible assets in the process of developing a business. Capi-
tal expenditures are not currently deductible under section 263, but
6. Section 212 also allows a deduction for expenditures incurred in connection with
the determination, collection or refund of any tax.
7. Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
8. 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
9. In addition to the deduction for research expenditures under § 174, § 30 provides a
tax credit equal to 25% of the excess of qualified research expenses for the year over the
average qualified research expenses incurred in a base period. The credit is available only for
research expenditures incurred "in carrying on any trade or business of the taxpayer," indi-
cating that Congress chose to require the same level of business activity employed by § 162,
rather than the lesser amount of activity required by § 174.
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may be deductible over time under section 167. Section 167 pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a depreciation de-
duction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
Section 168 (Accelerated cost recovery system) provides rules
for calculating the depreciation allowance for tangible property
built or acquired. Under these rules, property is placed in 3-year, 5-
year, 10-year, 15-year, and 19-year categories and depreciation is
computed under tables provided in section 168, and the regulations
thereunder. Property used in research falls into the 3-year category,
and most manufacturing equipment falls into the 5-year category.10
Intangible property can be depreciated only if it has a limited
useful life and if the length of the useful life can be estimated with
reasonable accuracy. 1 Examples are patents and copyrights. 2 An
intangible asset without a limited useful life is not subject to the
allowance for depreciation. Accordingly, no deduction for depreci-
ation is allowed with respect to goodwill or going concern value.' 3
Intangible property which has a determinable useful life is depreci-
ated on a pro rata basis over such life.' 4 However, in the case where
a taxpayer acquires an intangible asset in a transaction in which he
is required to make payments contingent on future revenues from
the use of the acquired asset, he has been permitted to deduct the
royalty payments as depreciation allowances." Furthermore, sec-
tion 1253(d)(1) allows the deduction of payments under section 162
on the acquisition of a trademark, trade name or franchise where
the payments are contingent on sales and the transferor retains a
significant right, power, or continuing interest in the property trans-
ferred; and section 1253(d)(2) allows lump sum payments to be am-
ortized and deducted under section 162 on transfers of trademarks,
trade names, and franchises where the transferor retains a signifi-
cant right, power or continuing interest.' 6
10. I.R.C. § 168(c)(2)(A) and (B) (1982).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a) (1960) provides that patents and copyrights shall be de-
preciated over their remaining useful life.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
14. I.R.C. § 167(c) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(c)-1(a)(1) (1960) (second sentence).
15. See Associated Patentees v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 979 (1945); Allied Tube & Con-
duit Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1218 (1975).
16. These rules do not apply to sport franchises. I.R.C. § 1253(e) (1969).
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The period for taking depreciation begins when the asset is
placed in service. I" An asset is considered placed in service when
the property is in a condition or state of readiness and availability
for a specifically designed function.18 In the case of a start-up, how-
ever, the same issue arises under section 167 as arises under section
162: Can a taxpayer place an asset in service and begin taking de-
preciation deductions prior to the taxpayer opening its doors and
being ready to generate revenue? The trade or business requirement
under section 167 has been interpreted similarly to the trade or
business requirement under section 16219 so that if one is not carry-
ing on a trade or business as interpreted under section 162, no de-
preciation deductions will be allowed. If the property is used for
research activities in connection with a trade or business, however,
a depreciation allowance will be allowed as a research and experi-
mental expenditure under section 174.20
G. Losses on Business Activities Under Section 165
If a start-up does not succeed, a loss deduction may be avail-
able under section 165. Section 165 allows a deduction for losses
sustained during the taxable year, limited to the adjusted basis of
the property involved.2 In the case of a start-up, the adjusted basis
would consist of the amount of nondeducted and unamortized
items. A loss must be evidenced by a closed and completed transac-
tion, fixed by identifiable events.22 A loss would be sustained on the
abandonment or sale of a start-up project.
H. Organizational Expenditures for Corporations and
Partnerships Under Section 248 and Section 709
Expenditures for the creation of a corporation or a partnership
are capital expenditures, and in the absence of a special rule, are not
deductible.2 3 However, section 248 provides that the taxpayer may
elect to amortize the "organization expenditures" of a corporation
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10 (1956).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(d)(I)(ii) (1984).
19. 1 BITTKER, supra note 5, at % 23.2.1.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(b)(1) (1960) provides in pertinent part as follows:
However, allowances for depreciation or depletion of property are considered
as research or experimental expenditures, for purposes of § 174, to the extent
that the property to which the allowances relate is used in connection with
research or experimentation ......
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c) (1977).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1977).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(b)(7) (1965).
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over a period selected by the taxpayer of not less than sixty months.
The amortization period begins with the month the corporation be-
gins business. "Organization expenditures" means any expenditure
incident to the creation of the corporation, chargeable to the capital
account, and of a character which, if expended incident to the crea-
tion of a corporation having a limited life, would be amortizable
over such life.24 Section 709 provides similar rules for the organiza-
tion of a partnership and, in addition, provides that if the partner-
ship is liquidated before the amortization period expires, the
unamortized amount may be deducted under section 165.
I. Trademark and Trade Name Expenditures
Under Section 177
Start-ups will generally be involved in acquiring trademarks
and a trade name. Expenditures incurred for acquiring, developing
or protecting a trademark or trade name are capital expenditures
without a determinable life and are not deductible in the absence of
a special provision. Section 177 provides that a taxpayer may elect
to amortize "trademark or trade name expenditures" over a period
selected by the taxpayer but not to be less than sixty months. The
term "trademark and trade name expenditures" means any expen-
diture directly connected with the acquisition, protection, expan-
sion, registration, or defense of a trademark or trade name which is
chargeable to capital and which is not part of the consideration paid
for a trademark, trade name or business.2 5 The amortization period
begins with the first month of the taxable year26 and, unlike the
amortization provisions of sections 248 and 709, is independent of
the beginning of a business. Thus, a start-up can begin amortizing
such expenditures prior to actually generating revenue.
If a taxpayer makes a section 177 election but fails to include
all trademark and trade name expenditures in the election, the tax-
payer cannot, according to the Commissioner, subsequently expand
his election to include the items not originally included in his
election.27
J. Interest Expenditures Under Section 163 and Tax
Expenditures Under Section 164
Neither section 163 nor section 164 have a trade or business or
24. I.R.C. § 248(b) (1976).
25. I.R.C. § 177(b) (1976).
26. I.R.C. § 177(a) (1976).
27. Rev. Rul. 79-333, 1979-2 C.B. 110.
[Vol. 2
DEDUCTING START-UP EXPENDITURES
production of income requirement. Therefore, interest expenditures
made by a start-up will be deductible under section 163 regardless
of whether business has commenced. z8 Likewise, payments for
property, sales, and income taxes are deductible under section 164
regardless of whether the taxpayer is actively engaged in business.
Section 266 allows a taxpayer to elect to capitalize certain taxes and
carrying charges incurred with respect to property held, acquired or
constructed by the taxpayer. 29
K. Use of Personal Residences for Business Purposes Under
Section 280A
Entrepreneurs often use their residences as a place to begin de-
veloping a business. Garages have been the incubators of many suc-
cessful businesses and continue to be used by new businesses
today.3" Section 280A imposes severe restrictions on the ability of
start-ups to qualify for deduction of expenses related to the use of
the personal residence, and cuts-off all possibility of deductions for
start-ups which are not generating revenue.
To qualify for a deduction, the maintenance, utilities expense,
and the depreciation of a residence, including a garage, must meet
the general rules of sections 162, 167, and 174. Thus a deduction
will be allowed only if the taxpayer can show that the personal resi-
dence, or a portion of it, is used in carrying on a trade or business or
in connection with a trade or business. In addition section 280A
imposes some qualifications and limitations on the deductibility of
expenses related to a personal residence. Section 280A(a) provides,
as a general rule, that no deduction otherwise allowable shall be
allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit3 which is used by
28. However, individuals will have to be concerned with the limit on deductions for
investment indebtedness under § 163(d).
29. It would seem that some taxes, such as sales taxes on the purchase of equipment,
are capital in nature and should be capitalized. However, in Commissioner v. Idaho Power
Co., 418 U.S. 1, 18 n.13 (1974), the United States Supreme Court considered § 266 to repre-
sent an exception to § 263. However, Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b)(3) (1960) states that § 266 has
no effect on the treatment otherwise accorded an item, and that items which are otherwise
capital in nature are to be so treated.
30. See Larimer, Car Computer Deters Drunken Driving, San Jose Mercury News, Aug.
9, 1985, at 1, col. 4. The article concerns a 66-year old inventor of a device called "Stay
Alive" which will not allow a car to be started unless the driver passes a blood-alcohol test.
The article indicates that the inventor developed the device after three years of tinkering in
his garage.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-l(c)(1) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980) defines a dwelling unit as in-
cluding a house, apartment, condominium, mobile home, boat, or similar property; the term
also includes all structures and other property appurtenant to a dwelling unit which do not
themselves constitute dwelling units.
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the taxpayer as a residence.3 2 However, section 280A(c)(1) pro-
vides some important exceptions to the general rule, providing in
pertinent part as follows:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item
is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively
used on a regular basis-
(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or busi-
ness of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients,
or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the
normal course of his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached
to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade
or business. 33
Accordingly, if the use of a personal residence is otherwise de-
ductible under sections 162, 167, or 174, section 280A will not dis-
qualify the deduction if the requirements of section 280A(c) are
met. However, these requirements are quite stringent. The portion
of the residence used for business must be exclusively used for busi-
ness and must be used as such on a regular basis.34 Thus, a room or
garage which is used for both business and personal purposes would
not qualify.35 In addition, the portion of the residence used for
business must be used either as the principal place of business of the
taxpayer or as a place of business which is used by customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer. In the case of a separate
structure, however, in addition to exclusivity, the taxpayer need
only show that it is used in connection with the taxpayer's trade or
business. Thus, it appears that an unattached garage is given more
liberal treatment than an attached garage.
A further limitation, and one which will disqualify start-ups
which are not generating any revenue, is the limit on allowable de-
32. Section 280A(c) provides that § 280A(b) does not apply to any deduction allowable
to the taxpayer without regard to his connection with a trade or business, or income produc-
ing activity, such as interest, taxes, casualty losses, etc.
33. In Feldman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1 (1985), the taxpayer avoided the
§ 280A(c)(1) limitations by leasing his home office and garage to his employer. The rented
area was used exclusively by Feldman for carrying out his responsibilities as an employee.
Feldman included the rental income on his return and deducted the costs of maintaining the
office which he computed to be 15% of his home. The tax court found the lease to be bona
fide and allowed Feldman to deduct a portion of his home, but cut the deduction to 9%.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(g)(1) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980) provides that the phrase "a
portion of the dwelling unit" refers to a room or other separately identifiable space. It is not
necessary, however, that the portion be marked off by a permanent partition.
35. If a portion of a garage is set aside and used exclusively for an activity, however,
that portion of the garage may qualify. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(g)(1) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980).
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ductions under section 280A(c)(5). Section 280A(c)(5) limits the
amount of deductions attributable to a dwelling unit to the gross
income derived from the use of the facility over the deductions al-
lowable for such use. As start-ups in the product development stage
generally do not generate any revenues, no deductions will be al-
lowed for the use of a personal residence or garage. Those start-ups
which have reached the revenue generating stage will be entitled to
deductions, subject to the revenue limitations imposed by section
280A(c)(5).36
If a business has reached the point of having an office outside
the residence of the entrepreneur, it may be difficult to prove that
the residence is the principal place of business, 37 and if such an of-
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(5) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980) provides the following rules in
determining the limitation under § 280(c)(5):
Business deductions with respect to the business use of a dwelling unit are
allowable in the following order and only to the following extent:
(i) The allocable portions of amounts allowable as deductions ... without
regard to any use in trade or business, e.g., mortgage interest and real estate
taxes, are allowable as business deductions to the extent of the gross income
derived from use of the unit.
(ii) Amounts otherwise allowable as deductions ... by reason of the busi-
ness use of the dwelling (other than those which would result in an adjust-
ment to the basis of the property) are allowable to the extent the gross
income derived from the use of the unit exceeds the deduction allowed or
allowable under subdivision (i).
(iii) Amounts otherwise allowable as deductions... by reason of the busi-
ness use of the dwelling which would result in an adjustment to the basis of
property are allowable to the extent the gross income derived from the use of
the unit exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable under subdivisions (i)
and (ii) of this subparagraph.
The effect of these ordering rules is that the taxpayer is first allowed those deductions
which he would have otherwise been allowed whether or not he is in a business; secondly, the
taxpayer is allowed to deduct out-of-pocket type trade or business expenses to the extent any
limitation is remaining; and, finally, is allowed any depreciation if any limitation is remaining
after deduction of the first two categories.
Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(I)(2)(iii) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980) defines gross income as income
derived from the business activity in the unit reduced by expenditures required for the activ-
ity but not allocable to use of the unit itself, such as expenditures for supplies and compensa-
tion paid to other persons. This interpretation was rejected by the tax court in Scott v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 45 (1985), where the tax court indicated that gross income was com-
puted without reduction for the expenditures mandated by the proposed regulation. See
Hira, Murphy and Lacock, Home Office Deductions May be Significantly Increased After
Scott, 63 TAXES 631 (Sept. 1985).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980) provides that where a tax-
payer engages in a single trade or business in more than one location, it is necessary to deter-
mine the taxpayer's principal place of business in light of all the facts and circumstances. The
proposed regulation provides that the following be considered with all of the facts and
circumstances:
(i) The portion of the total income from the business which is attributable to
activities at each location;
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fice is used to meet customers, it may be difficult to prove that the
residence is a place that is used in dealing with customers in the
ordinary course of business.38 However, even if the business uses an
office away from the residence as a principal place of business or for
meeting customers, an unattached garage can qualify under section
280A(c)(1)(C) since it would probably meet the "in connection with
a trade or business requirement."
If a taxpayer meets all the requirements of section 280A and is
entitled to deductions, the Commissioner's proposed regulations
state that the taxpayer may determine the expenses allocable to the
portion of the unit used for business purposes by any method that is
reasonable under the circumstances.39 If the rooms in the dwelling
unit are of approximately equal size, the taxpayer may allocate the
general expenses for the unit according to the number of rooms
used for business purposes. The taxpayer may also allocate general
expenses according to the percentage of total floor space in the unit
that is used for business purposes. Expenses which are attributable
to only certain portions of the unit, e.g., repairs to kitchen fixtures,
shall be allocated in full to those portions of the unit. Expenses
which are not related to the use of the unit for business purposes,
e.g., expenditures for lawn care, are not taken into account for the
purposes of section 280A.'
L. Activities Not Engaged in for Profit Under Section 183
Section 183 applies to individuals and provides that no deduc-
tion is allowable for activities not engaged in for profit except as
provided in section 183. Section 183 generally provides that an in-
dividual engaged in a not-for-profit activity will be allowed deduc-
tions to the extent of the gross income received from the activity.
(ii) The amount of time spent in activities related to that business at each loca-
tion; and
(iii) The facilities available to the taxpayer at each location for purposes of that
business.
The issue of where the principal place of business is located appears to be one subject to
much controversy. In Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd 79 T.C.
605 (1982), a musician for the Metropolitan Opera was allowed to treat his apartment as his
principal place of business because he spent a great deal of time practicing at home. See Note,
Sweet Music to Taxpayers' Ears: Section 280A and the Home Office Deduction After Drucker
v. Commissioner and the New Proposed Regulations, 4 VA. TAX REV. 163 (1984).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(c) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980) provides that customers must be
physically on the premises; conversations by telephone do not qualify. The use of the dwell-
ing by customers must be substantial and integral to the conduct of the taxpayer's business.
Occasional meetings are insufficient.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(3) (proposal Aug. 7, 1980).
40. Id.
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The significance of section 183 in the case of start-ups is that section
183(c) and the regulations thereunder basically provide that if an
activity is not a not-for-profit activity, then the deductions are al-
lowable under section 162 or section 212. The regulations under
section 183 provide guidelines as to what is a not-for-profit activity
and what is not. These guidelines can help a taxpayer determine if
he meets the trade or business requirement of section 162, and are
further discussed in Part III. C. below.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION PRIOR TO THE 1984
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 195
The statutes discussed in Part II above have generated much
judicial controversy, as the Commissioner and taxpayers have
fought in the courts over the deductibility of start-up costs. The
following discussion will analyze the state of the law prior to the
amendments to section 195 made by the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
As will be discussed in Part IV, the impact of these amendments is
not clear and the existing case law should have continued validity.
A. Start-Up Costs as Capital Expenditures
Expenditures made during a year must be properly classified
between capital and expense. As explained in the regulations: "....
expenditures which have a useful life extending substantially be-
yond the taxable year shall be charged to the capital account and
not to an expense account."4 This general rule has been accepted
in the case law, as exemplified by the following statement made by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Akin:42
[A]n expenditure should be treated as one of a capital outlay if it
brings about the acquisition of an asset having a period of useful
life in excess of one year, or if it secures a like advantage to the
taxpayer which has a life of more than one year.
In practice, however, the Commissioner and the courts have
not attempted to capitalize every expenditure that produces a bene-
fit that carries into future years. Advertising, training, long-term
planning, and employee relations are examples of activities which
carry future benefits to businesses, but which the Commissioner and
the courts have allowed existing businesses to expense on a current
basis. In Commissioner v. Tellier43, the United States Supreme
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (1973).
42. 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957).
43. 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
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Court stated:
The principal function of the term 'ordinary' in section 162 is to
clarify the distinction ... between those expenses that are cur-
rently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital ex-
penditures, which if deductible at all, must be amortized over the
useful life of the asset.
Courts have also allowed expenditures to be currently ex-
pensed when the expenditure does not create or enhance any dis-
tinct and separate asset. This test was first developed in
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n.," where the court
stated the following:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future
aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible
have prospective effect beyond the taxable year .... What is
important and controlling, we feel is that the ... payment serves
to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate
and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable conse-
quence, the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let
alone an ordinary expense, deductible under section 162(a) in the
absence of other factors not established here.
4 5
In the case of start-ups, however, the Commissioner and most
courts have not been so liberal in their application of section 263. A
common view is that all expenditures incurred prior to the com-
mencement of business, whether ordinary or not, are capital ex-
penditures.4 6 Thus, while existing businesses can expense many
arguably capital-type expenditures as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses, start-ups cannot.
There are probably several reasons for this dichotomous treat-
ment. The most likely reason is that the start-up situation lends
itself to taxpayer abuse of treating personal expenses as business ex-
penses. Rather than police this area, the Commissioner would
rather disallow all start-up expenditures. A second reason is that
expenditures of start-ups are less likely to provide a current benefit
than in the case of an existing business, and it may be more appro-
priate to capitalize expenditures for such expenses as advertising
and training. However, not all expenditures incurred by a start-up
provide value beyond the taxable year when made. For example, if
an employee is trained and leaves the company during the same
44. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
45. Id. at 354.
46. See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'd
and remanded on another issue, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
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year, the training does not provide value beyond the taxable year.
Similar problems are incurred with many other expenses. Unsuc-
cessful attempts to obtain suppliers or distributors, unsuccessful at-
tempts to hire employees, abandoned marketing plans, and
recurring rent, utility and maintenance expenses all represent ex-
penses that do not create value that last beyond the taxable year.
A final reason may be that the Commissioner views a trade or
business as a self-constructed asset, and that the expenditures in-
curred in building a trade or business must be capitalized in the
same way that depreciation of trucks was required to be capitalized
in Commissioner v. Idaho Power.47 In Idaho Power the taxpayer
used trucks in constructing relatively long-lived assets, and at-
tempted to depreciate the trucks over their useful life. The United
States Supreme Court indicated that there was no doubt that the
depreciation of the trucks, as well as supplies, materials and wages
in constructing the assets of the taxpayer, had to be capitalized and
depreciated over the life of the assets being constructed.4" If a trade
or business is analogized to the tangible assets being constructed in
Idaho Power, then all expenses incurred in building a trade or busi-
ness must be capitalized.
But the Idaho Power analogy presents some difficulties. A
trade or business is not a single asset. It is an aggregation of assets.
It may include trade names and trademarks, patents, copyrights,
prototypes, a trained staff, a favorable lease, goodwill and the like.
In the case of an ongoing business, expenditures are made for the
same purposes as in the start-up. Amounts are spent to build proto-
types, train staff, find and develop favorable locations and the like.
But the Commissioner does not invoke section 263 to disallow such
expenditures of existing businesses unless the expenditure is in-
curred to build or enhance a tangible asset or a separate and distinct
intangible asset.49
47. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
48. In explaining the priority given to § 263, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Finally, the priority ordering directive of § 161 - or for that matter, § 261 of
the Code,... requires that the capitalization provision of § 263(a) take prece-
dence, on the facts here over § 167(a). Section 161 provides that deductions
specified in Part VI of Subehapter B of the Income Tax Subtitle of the Code are
"subject to the exceptions provided in Part IX." Part VI includes § 167 and
Part IX includes § 263. The clear import of § 161 is that, with stated excep-
tions set forth in § 263 itself or provided elsewhere.., none of which is appli-
cable here, an expenditure incurred in acquiring capital assets must be
capitalized even if the expenditure might be deductable under Part VI.
Id. at 17.
49. See Letter Rul. 8423005.
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B. Investigatory Expenses
Businesspersons generally incur investigatory expenses prior to
acquiring or entering into a business. The investigatory activity
may involve deciding whether to enter into business in the first
place, selecting a particular industry, and choosing a particular
business within an industry. Investigatory activities usually include
travel, legal and other professional advice, marketing surveys and
other similar type expenses.
The most instructive and probably the leading case dealing
with investigatory expenses5" is Frank v. Commissioner."1 Morton
Frank was released from the Navy in November of 1945, after
which he and his wife Agnes decided to investigate the purchase of
either a newspaper or radio station. Frank was a newspaperman,
and had considered purchasing a newspaper or radio station prior
to and during his Navy service. At the end of November, 1945 the
Franks began a trip to investigate businesses in Ohio, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, Oklahoma, California, and New Mexico. The Franks
temporarily halted their search, however, when they were offered
employment by a Phoenix, Arizona newspaper. While residing in
Phoenix they continued looking for a business and made several of-
fers to purchase newspapers. In 1946, Morton and Agnes spent ap-
proximately $7,000 on investigatory expenses including $1,000 paid
to an attorney in connection with unsuccessful negotiations to
purchase a newspaper in Wilmington, Delaware. In November,
1946, the Franks purchased a newspaper in Canton, Ohio, and com-
menced publication of the Canton Economist that month.
The Franks deducted their investigatory expenses on their tax
return for 1946, and the Commissioner disallowed the deduction.
Thereafter, tax court determined that the Franks were not entitled
to deductions under the precursors of sections 1622 and 212,11 and
were not entitled to a loss deduction under the precursor of section
165."4 Although based on prior law, the tax court opinion retains
its vitality since the current statutes are not significantly different
from prior law.
The tax court's denial of a deduction under the precursor of
section 162 for the Frank's expenses incurred in investigating and
looking for a business was based on its belief that such expenses had
50. See supra note 11.
51. See supra note 7.
52. I.R.C. § 23(a)(1) (1939).
53. I.R.C. § 23(a)(2) (1939).
54. I.R.C. § 23(e)(2) (1939).
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not been incurred in carrying on a trade or business. The court
noted that the law presupposes an existing business with which the
taxpayer is connected, and found that the taxpayers' expenses of
looking for the business were incurred before they actually began
carrying on a trade or business.
The tax court in Frank also denied any deductions under the
precursor of section 212. There is a basic distinction between al-
lowing deductions for the expense of producing or collecting in-
come in which one has an existent right, and expenses incurred in
an attempt to obtain income by the creation of some new interest.
The tax court found that the taxpayers' expenditures were of the
latter category.
Lastly, the tax court denied the Frank's deduction under the
precursor of section 165 noting that this section allows deductions
for transactions entered into for profit. The court found that the
only transaction entered into for profit by the Franks was the
purchase of the newspaper in Canton, Ohio. The court rejected the
notion that the Franks entered into a transaction for profit each
time they visited a new city and examined a new business property.
Rather, the Franks had refused to enter into such transactions after
the preliminary investigation.
However, if a taxpayer decides to acquire a specific business
but the transaction falls through, the expenses with regard to pursu-
ing such transaction are deductible as a loss under section 165.11
The only way a taxpayer can deduct general investigatory ex-
penditures incurred with respect to an unacquired business is to
add these expenditures to the basis of an acquired business. In
Akers v. Commissioner,6 the Commissioner did not dispute that ex-
penditures to investigate various sites for a waterslide amusement
business were capital expenditures incurred in the formation of the
business at the site ultimately chosen. It is not clear if the Commis-
sioner would have taken the same position if the case involved the
sale or abandonment of the waterslide 7 If the Commissioner were
55. Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63 (taxpayer had decided to acquire a particular
business and incurred legal fees in drafting purchase documents, but after disagreements be-
tween the owner of the business and the taxpayer, the taxpayer abandoned his attempts to
acquire the business); Seed v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 880 (1969) (taxpayer had decided to
begin a savings and loan association and incurred legal expenses in seeking a charter, but
abandoned the project when the application for the charter was rejected.)
56. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1458 (1981).
57. Rev. Rul. 73-421, 1973-2 C.B. 33 (the issue was not specifically addressed but the
ruling indicates that the cost of inspecting several sites for a boys' camp was not added to the
cost of the site finally chosen).
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to adopt this position, taxpayers could add investigatory costs to the
basis of their business eventually formed, and receive a benefit from
those expenditures when the business is sold or abandoned.
Frank dealt with investigatory expenses of finding a particular
business within a particular industry. Expenditures incurred in de-
ciding on a particular industry would be one step removed from the
investigatory expenditures in Frank, however, and expenditures in-
curred in deciding to enter into business at all would be two steps
removed. Presumably, neither expenditures would be deductible
under sections 162, 212 and 165 for the same reason "particular
business" investigatory expenses were denied deductibility in
Frank.58 Moreover, such expenses are probably too remote to be
considered business formation costs as was found in Akers.
C. The Trade or Business Requirement
In order to obtain a deduction under section 162 a taxpayer
must be carrying on a trade or business. In connection with start-
ups the critical question is whether a taxpayer can be carrying on a
trade or business prior to generating revenue. The leading case on
this question is Richmond Television Corp. v. United States."9 In
Richmond, the defendant taxpayer attempted to deduct expendi-
tures incurred prior to obtaining an FCC broadcasting license for
the training of staff necessary for the operation of a television sta-
tion. The court found the issue to be whether the defendant tax-
payer was "in business" during the period in question. The court
analyzed existing case law dealing with the start of a trade or busi-
ness, and concluded:
The uniform teaching of these several cases is that, even though a
taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter into a business and
over a considerable period of time spent money in preparation
for entering that business, he still has not "engaged in carrying
on any trade or business" within the intendment of section
162(a) until such time as the business has begun to function as a
going concern and performed those activities for which it was
organized.60
58. In Kilroy v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (1973), the taxpayer had consider-
able sources of nonbusiness income and spent 20 years investigating various trades and busi-
nesses; during the years in question he had paid for a study regarding the feasibility of lasers
in mining, but had no gross income from mining and owned no mines. The court found that
the taxpayer was not carrying on a trade or business and did not allow a deduction for the fee
for the laser study.
59. 345 F.2d 901.
60. Id. at 907.
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Applying this teaching to the facts of the instant case, the court
reversed the district court's judgment for taxpayer finding that the
court had erred in failing to find, as a matter of law, that Richmond
Television was not "in business" until it obtained its license and
began broadcasting.
Richmond has been followed in several recent cases and has
come to stand for the principle that a trade or business does not
begin until the taxpayer is ready to produce revenues.
In Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner,61 the taxpayer
was involved in a joint venture for the construction of a nuclear
power plant. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed ex-
penditures incurred during construction of the plant for training
employees and other expenses relating to the start-up of the nuclear
power plant, citing Richmond as its authority. In Kennedy v. Com-
missioner,' a pharmacist started his own retail drugstore and in-
curred certain expenses prior to actually opening the doors. These
expenses included a three months supply of prescription labels,
maintenance fee for burglar alarm, hardware, and rent. Citing
Richmond, the tax court found that the pharmacy did not begin to
function as a going concern until it opened its doors to the public,
and that as a result, all expenditures incurred prior to opening its
doors were nondeductible.
In view of the credence given to the holding in Richmond by
other courts, it is worthwhile to determine if the analysis made by
the Richmond court can withstand close scrutiny. The Richmond
court cited five cases in support of its position: Frank B. Polachek v.
Commissioner,63 Radio Station WBIR v. Commissioner,' KWTX
Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner,65 Petersburg Television Corp. v.
Commissioner,66 and Cohn v. United States.67
An examination of these cases reveals that none support the
broad principle of law that a taxpayer is not engaged in carrying on
a trade or business until the business reaches the point where it is
ready to generate revenue.
In Polachek, the taxpayer spent $544 on planning an invest-
ment advisory service in late 1947, but the business was never for-
mally organized and the taxpayer abandoned the project in 1948.
61. 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), afid, 72 T.C. 521 (1979).
62. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 (1973).
63. 22 T.C. 858 (1954).
64. 31 T.C. 803 (1959).
65. 31 T.C. 952 (1959), af'd per curiam, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959).
66. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 271 (1961).
67. 57 U.S.T.C. % 9457, affid on other grounds, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
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The tax court held that the taxpayer had no business in 1947, that
at most he had plans for a potential business, and that the idea was
still in the formative stage when it was finally abandoned.
In Radio Station WBIR, the taxpayer owned a radio station.
In 1951, the taxpayer applied for a television station construction
permit. The permit was granted in 1955 and the taxpayer began
broadcasting in 1956. Prior to 1956, the taxpayer had incurred var-
ious legal, travel and engineering fees in pursuing his application for
the license. The tax court stated that at the time the expenses were
incurred, the taxpayer was not engaged in the operation of a televi-
sion station and had no facilities for such an operation. Therefore,
the court held the taxpayer's expenses were not incurred in carrying
on a trade or business.
In KWTX Broadcasting, the taxpayer paid $45,000 to reim-
burse a competitor for its expenses in seeking a license in exchange
for which he received the competitor's promise to dismiss its appli-
cation for the license. The tax court held that the expenditures were
in the nature of a capital expenditure in connection with the acqui-
sition of a television permit and license.
In Petersburg Television, the taxpayer was incorporated in 1953
and shortly thereafter filed for a television license. The taxpayer
was granted a construction permit in 1954, and began broadcasting
in 1955. The taxpayer sought to deduct salary, travel, and profes-
sional fees in seeking its license. The tax court held, as a matter of
fact, that the taxpayer's business began in 1955, and that the ex-
penditures incurred prior to that point were nondeductible, prebusi-
ness expenses.
Finally, in Cohn, the taxpayer contracted with the Army in
December, 1940 to operate flying schools which began operating in
March, 1941. In preparing for the opening, the taxpayer spent large
sums of money on training instructors, legal fees and leases. With-
out legal analysis, the district court held that these expenses were
nonrecurrent capital expenditures not deductible from income.
All of the cases cited by the court in Richmond, with the ex-
ceptions of Polachek and Cohn, involved television licenses. Pola-
chek should not carry much weight in supporting the Richmond
rule because it involved a taxpayer who never left the investigatory
phase and had not yet made a firm decision to enter a trade or busi-
ness. Cohn is likewise of limited significance because the case con-
tains no legal analysis of the trade or business issue in the court's
decision. The teaching of the remaining cases appears to be that the
expenses incurred prior to obtaining a television license and begin-
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ning to broadcast are nondeductible. The expenses in these cases
were generally nonrecurrent expenditures incurred in securing a li-
cense, and in the nature of capital expenditures. Thus, disallowance
of a substantial amount of the expenses involved in these decisions
could have properly rested on the principles of section 263.
The extension of the Richmond principle to cover all businesses
and all pre-opening expenditures seems to be an overly broad appli-
cation. The court of claims in Blitzer v. U.S. ,6 recognized the limi-
tations of the Richmond rule and refused to apply it in a case
involving the start-up of a real estate project by a limited
partnership.
In Blitzer, the taxpayer attempted to deduct management fees
paid in 1973 for the performance of various services in connection
with an apartment complex which was not completed until 1974.
The court of claims disallowed the taxpayer's deduction on the basis
that the taxpayer had not sustained the burden of providing a ra-
tional basis for separating deductible fees from nondeductible fees.
The court made clear its belief that the Richmond rule was
incorrect. The court found that the function of "trade or business"
in section 162(a), as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in Tellier is merely to provide that family or personal ex-
penses are nondeductible. Construing section 162 in this light, the
Blitzer court found that the trade or business requirement was no
barrier to the taxpayer's 1973 deduction because at all times during
that year, the partnership was engaged in endeavors serving busi-
ness or profit-making purposes, rather than personal ones. The
court distinguished Richmond and Madison Gas by pointing out
that the Tellier principle was never considered by either court.69
The courts in both cases regarded the expenditures as nondeduct-
ible capital expenditures under tax law standards apart from the
trade or business requirement of section 162. The Blitzer court
stated its position as follows:
If the defendant's construction of I.R.C. sections 162 and 212
were correct, it would deny the deductions to new corporations
or partnerships for amortization of organization and loan costs,
for payment of telephone and other utility bills, rent, stationery,
68. 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
69. Interestingly, in North Carolina Nat'l. Bank v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 289 n.
4, (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals changed its position on capital ex-
penditures and replaced the one year rule with the separate and distinct asset test established
by the United States Supreme Court in Lincoln Savings. Consequently, if the Fourth Circuit
had a chance to consider Tellier, which was published one year after Richmond, it is probable
the Fourth Circuit would have taken a position similar to Blitzer.
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and salaries and wages of corporate officers, secretaries, and even
for those who sweep the floor, merely because the business enter-
prise is not yet in a position to earn income. But this goes too
far. Neither section 162 nor section 212 require precise matching
of income and expenses in the same year. Defendant has sup-
plied no reason why normal recurring expenses to maintain any
business enterprise, and which are not in the nature of start-up
costs nor intended to provide benefits extending beyond the taxa-
ble year in question, should not be deductible as ordinary ex-
penses of such business irrespective of whether or not the
business has yet completed construction or acquisition of its in-
come producing asset.7 °
The Blitzer court's position is clear that if a profit motive ex-
ists, deductions should be allowed for normal recurring expenses.
The point in time when the taxpayer is ready to earn income is
irrelevant.
The difference in interpretation between Blitzer and Richmond
is obviously of great importance to high-technology start-ups. A
great deal of money is often spent during the period beginning with
the product idea and ending with the realization of the product in
the market place. If high-technology start-ups are unable to deduct
start-up expenditures other than research and experimental ex-
penses, entrepreneurs will be less likely to obtain the financing
needed to get the project started in the first place.
The Blitzer interpretation is supported by regulations under
various sections of the Code. For example, sections 248 and 709
allow corporations and partnerships, respectively, to amortize their
organizational expenses beginning with the month the corporation
or partnership "begins business." In the case of both code sections
the regulations state that the date when a corporation or partner-
ship begins business is a question of fact that must be determined in
each case in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.71
Ordinarily, a business will be considered to begin when it com-
mences the business operations for which it was organized. If the
activities of the business have advanced to the extent necessary to
establish the nature of the business operations, it will be deemed to
have begun business. Accordingly, the acquisition of operating as-
sets which are necessary to the type of business contemplated may
constitute the beginning of a business. The term "operating assets,"
as used in the regulations, means assets that are in a state of readi-
70. 684 F.2d at 880.
71. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.284-1(a)(3) (1960) and 1.709-2(c) (1983).
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ness to be placed in service within a "reasonable period" following
their acquisition.72
The time a corporation "begins business" should equate to the
time when a corporation begins to carry on a trade or business.
Otherwise there would be different dates for deducting section 162
expenses and for amortizing organizational expenses. There is
nothing in the legislative history indicating that Congress intended
that organizational expenses should have a different start date for
deductibility than other expenditures. Moreover, different starting
dates would require a taxpayer to make separate determinations of
when a business begins for section 162, and for sections 248 and
709.
If we apply the regulations under sections 248 and 709 to the
Richmond facts, we obtain a different result. In Richmond, the
court equated the training of the employees prior to the receipt of a
license as the acquisition or development of an asset, i.e., a trained
staff. By applying the rules of sections 248 and 709, an argument
can be made that the acquisition of a trained staff is the acquisition
of an asset which is necessary to the type of business contemplated
and which is in a state of readiness to be placed in service within a
reasonable period following its acquisition. Moreover, it is signifi-
cant that the section 709 regulations were published in 1983, well
after the Richmond decision and after the enactment of section 195
in 1980.
Just as significantly, section 183 and the regulations' examples
thereunder, appear to validate the theory of Blitzer that the purpose
of the trade or business requirement is to distinguish between per-
sonal and for profit activities.
The regulation under section 183 provides guidelines as to
whether an activity is engaged in for profit. If an activity is engaged
in for profit, it appears that the expenditures incurred in such activ-
ity are deductible under section 162 or section 212."3 Essentially,
section 183 equates an activity engaged in for profit with carrying
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(c) (1983) has a requirement that the assets be in a state of
readiness to be placed in service within a reasonable time following their aquisition, but
Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(a)(3) (1960) merely requires aquisition of operating assets which are
necessary to the type of business contemplated, without any reference to when they would be
placed in service. However, since the § 709 regulations were published after § 248 regula-
tions it is reasonable to assume that this additional modification provided by the § 709 regula-
tions applies to § 248 as well.
73. Section 183 applies only to individuals. The regulations under § 183 state that no
inference is to be drawn from the rules under § 183 as to whether the activity of a corporation
is engaged in for profit. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1 (1972). However, other than the fact that
§ 183 applies only to individuals, there does not appear to be any substantive reason not to
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on a trade or business. The significance of this result to a start-up
business is that the guidelines under section 183 do not adopt the
Richmond pre-opening doctrine. An activity can be engaged in for
profit before it is ready to generate revenue.
The statutory basis for this result is section 183(c) which pro-
vides, in effect, that an activity is engaged in for profit if it is one for
which deductions are allowed under section 162 or paragraphs (1)
or (2) of section 212. In addition, the regulations under section 183
provide that an "activity not engaged in for profit" means an activ-
ity other than one for which deductions are allowable under section
162 and section 212 subsections (1) and (2).' 4 Thus, the Code and
regulations appear to provide two categories of activities: those ac-
tivities which are not engaged in for profit, which are subject to the
limitations of section 183, and those activities which are engaged in
for profit and which are deductible under section 162 or section 212.
It is not evident that the drafters of section 183 contemplated a
third category of expenditure; namely, an activity engaged in for
profit but which does not qualify for a deduction under section 162
or section 212. In general, the section 183 regulation provides as
follows:
The determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit
is to be made by reference to objective standards, taking into ac-
count all of the facts and circumstances of each case. Although a
reasonable expectation of profit is not required, the facts and cir-
cumstances must indicate that the taxpayer entered into the ac-
tivity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a
profit. In determining whether such an objective exists, it may be
sufficient that there is a small chance of making a large profit.
Thus it may be found that an investor in a wildcat oil well who
incurs very substantial expenditures is in the venture for profit
even though the expectation of a profit may be considered
unreasonable. 7s
In particular, the regulations provide nine factors to be considered
in determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit.76 These
factors are as follows: 1) the manner in which the taxpayer carries
on the activity; 2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors; 3)
the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the
activity; 4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may ap-
use the guidelines under § 183 for determining whether the activities of a corporation are
engaged in for profit and, hence, whether such activities are deductible under § 162.
74. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.183-1(a) (1972) and 1.183-2(a) (1972).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
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preciate in value; 5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other
similar or dissimilar activities; 6) the taxpayer's history of income
or losses with respect to the activity; 7) the amount of occasional
profits, if any, which are earned; 8) the financial status of the tax-
payer; and 9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. No
one factor is to be determinative, and other factors can be consid-
ered as well. Further, the determination should not be based simply
on whether the number of factors indicating the lack of profit objec-
tive exceeds the number of factors indicating a profit objective.
None of these nine factors was considered in Richmond. Had
the Richmond court applied them, the taxpayer likely would have
been held to be engaged in a trade or business well before it received
its FCC license and started broadcasting, as it is clear that the tax-
payer in Richmond had a profit motive from the start of activity.
The application of these nine factors to a typical high-technology
start-up business would also lead to the conclusion that a trade or
business exists and that deductions are allowable during the start-up
period. This is made clear by the following example provided in the
regulations:
C, a chemist, is employed by a large chemical company and is
engaged in a wide variety of basic research projects for his em-
ployer. Although he does no work for his employer with respect
to the development of new plastics, he has always been interested
in such development and has outfitted a workshop in his home at
his own expense which he uses to experiment in the field. He has
patented several developments at his own expense but as yet has
realized no income from his inventions or from such patents. C
conducts his research on a regular, systematic basis, incurs fees
to secure consultation on his projects from time to time, and
makes extensive efforts to "market" his developments. C has de-
voted substantial time and expense in an effort to develop a
plastic sufficiently hard, durable, and malleable that it could be
used in lieu of sheet metal in many major applications, such as
automobile bodies. Although there may be only a small chance
that C will invent new plastics, the return from any such devel-
opment would be so large that it induces C to incur the costs of
his experimental work. C is sufficiently qualified by his back-
ground that there is some reasonable basis for his experimental
activities. C's experimental work does not involve substantial
personal or recreational aspects and is conducted in an effort to
find practical applications for his work. Under these circum-
stances, C may be found to be engaged in the experimental activi-
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ties for profit. (emphasis added)7 7
This example paints a picture similar to the early beginnings of
many high-technology start-ups, and yet, it would allow the chem-
ist-entrepreneur to deduct his start-up expenses, including market-
ing expenses, even though he has not generated any revenue, has
very little expectation of generating revenues in the future and is not
in position to generate revenue under the standards of Richmond
and Madison Gas. Moreover, the example follows the teaching of
Blitzer, which found that the only purpose of the trade or business
requirement in section 162 is to distinguish between personal and
business activities. The example is hard to reconcile with the Rich-
mond line of cases, especially in view of the fact that the regulation
was published in 1972, well after the Richmond decision.
D. Geographic Expansion as a Capital Expenditure
In the case of geographic expansions, the issue is not whether
the business has begun but whether the expenditures relating to the
expansion are nondeductible capital expenditures. In analyzing ex-
pansions, the principal cases have looked to the rule established in
Lincoln Savings7" providing that an expenditure is not a capital ex-
penditure unless it serves to create or enhance a separate and dis-
tinct asset. The Second and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have
reached the conclusion that a geographic expansion does not create
a separate and distinct asset. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has held otherwise. In a recent private letter ruling the Internal
Revenue Service appears to accept the position of the Second and
Fourth Circuits.7 9
The position of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,1° in which a candy man-
ufacturer, which owned its retail stores primarily in urban areas, set
up a franchise division within the company to promote sales of its
products through other retail outlets, such as pharmacies, primarily
in suburban areas. The company adopted the franchise alternative
after it found that its company-owned suburban stores failed to at-
tract satisfactory business. Though the sales group handling this
business was known as the "Franchise Division," it was part of the
sales department of the company. The company treated the costs of
developing the network, such as sales calls and advertisements in
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(c), example (6) (1972).
78. 403 U.S. 345.
79. Letter Rul. 8423005.
80. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
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trade magazines, as deductible business expenses. The Commis-
sioner disallowed these deductions, reasoning that the expenditures
were distinct from the operating expenses of the division and were
actually capital in nature because they were incurred in obtaining
159 franchise contracts.
Under the franchise contracts, the retail store proprietor
agreed to set aside a space in the store for a refrigerating display and
storage counter at his own expense, to be exclusively used for the
sale of taxpayer's candies. Taxpayer agreed to supply the retailer
with its candies at a discount from retail and to assist the proprietor
in setting up and operating the sales area. It also agreed not to
enfranchise competing stores within a specified area. The contracts
remained in operation for terms varying from one to five years and,
after the initial term, were to continue unless terminated by either
party upon thirty days notice.
The Second Circuit did not think the franchise contracts repre-
sented a valuable right, as the contracts did not give the taxpayer
any property interest in the area of the retail store devoted to the
taxpayer's products; the retailer did not agree to sell a minimum
amount of candy, nor did he agree to any minimum amount of
sales, and the store owner did not agree not to sell similar candy
products of other manufacturers.
The court held that the expenditures would be capital only if
they served to create a separate and distinct additional asset, and
that the ordinary use of such term included items of ownership of a
permanent or fixed nature which are convertible into cash. The
court considered the fruits of the contracts as no different from the
results a number of good commission-paid salesmen in the same
territory would have achieved and such commission would clearly
be deductible under section 162. Accordingly, the court held that
the taxpayer did not acquire any new separate and distinct asset in
the franchise agreements.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals followed Briarcliff in
NCNB Corp. v. United States,"' a case involving a bank which was
opening numerous branches throughout the state of North Caro-
lina. As part of the expansion process, NCNB Corporation in-
curred a variety of expenditures, including expenditures for long-
range planning studies, feasibility studies regarding a particular lo-
cation, and applications to the controller of the currency. The bank
capitalized all costs connected with building and equipping the new
81. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
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facilities, but deducted as current expenses under section 162 other
costs incurred in the expansion process.
The court found the Briarcliff reasoning applicable to the case
before it since both involved expansions into a new territory, and
the costs NCNB incurred in exploring expansions were similar to
the costs incurred in Briarcliff for developing the franchise network.
In determining whether the branches were separate and distinct as-
sets within the meaning of Lincoln, the court indicated that the non-
convertibility of the branches into cash was a significant but not
determinative factor.
The court cited a line of credit card cases 2 as support for the
deduction of NCNB's expenditures under section 162. The court
found the facts in each of these credit card cases to be similar. The
taxpayer banks involved were issuing credit cards either directly or
through cooperative organizations. In the process, the banks in-
curred start-up expenses such as computer costs, computer services,
advertising, credit bureau reports, travel and the like. All of these
expenses were claimed as ordinary business expenses. In First Na-
tional Bank of South Carolina v. United States, 3 the Fourth Circuit
had allowed such expenditures as deductions even though the tax-
payer had incurred its expenses as an assessment by a cooperative
association. The Fourth Circuit quoted approvingly from Colorado
Springs National Bank v. United States84 in which the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a prop-
erty interest. They produced nothing corporeal or saleable.
They are recurring. At the most they introduced a more effi-
cient method of conducting an old business.
8 5
Based upon Briarcliff and the credit card cases, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held in NCNB that the expenditures did not create a separate
and distinct asset and should not be capitalized. In particular, the
court held that the controller's permission did not create a separate
and distinct asset because it did not represent an exclusive territo-
rial franchise, was not transferrable, and the branch bank was not
readily saleable as such. The court contrasted a branch bank with a
television station and found that a branch bank has no value except
82. First Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979);
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979); First Nat'l.
Bank of South Carolina v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Colorado Springs
Nat'l. Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
83. 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977).
84. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 1192.
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its tangible and real assets apart from its parent, as compared to the
immense value of a television station with a construction permit or
license.
A similar approach was taken in Letter Ruling 8423005 in
which training costs were incurred in connection with the establish-
ment of twenty-six new restaurants. The taxpayer had similar res-
taurants operating in other geographical areas under the same trade
name. The ruling cited Briarcliff and concluded that "no separate
asset is created when the company merely expands the identical
business to a new geographical location."
A conflicting position, however, was taken by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Central Texas Savings and Loan Ass'n. v.
United States86 . That case, like NCNB, dealt with a new bank
branch requiring approval from state banking regulators. The court
relied on Briarcliff as did the Fourth Circuit, but distinguished its
facts from Briarcliff:87
Following Briarcliff we find that Central Texas had a property
interest in its branch offices. It had a separate right to do busi-
ness in a new territory which it acquired by virtue of the permit.
It had the right to receive new accounts for new customers in a
new market. It gained the right to challenge the right of entry of
competitors into the local market. Even an intangible property
right, such as the right to do business may be a capital item.8
8
Accordingly, the court held that the taxpayer obtained a sepa-
rate and identifiable business right and the branch offices were sepa-
rate and distinct assets within the Lincoln Savings definition.
If Letter Ruling 8423005 represents the Commissioner's posi-
tion in this area, then the conflict may soon be resolved. The legis-
lative history to section 195 indicates that in the case of an existing
business, expenditures for expansion are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses, and that the determination of whether
86. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
87. It appears that the court may have misinterpreted a statement by the Briarcliff
court in distinguishing its own facts from those in Briarcliff. The court stated that Briarcliff
distinguished itself from the creation of new branches and cities and cited the following from
Briarcliff-
[Tihe changes which Loft made in its own internal organization to spread its
sales into a new territory were not comparable to the aquisition of a new addi-
tional branch or division to make or sell a new and different product.
475 F.2d at 782.
The court felt this language indicated that Briarcliff had distinguished its facts with
regard to the opening of a new branch. But it appears the Briarcliff court was only distin-
guishing its situation from the establishment of a branch to sell a new or different product.
88. 731 F.2d at 1185.
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there is an expansion or the start-up of a new trade or business is to
be based on the facts and circumstances of each case.89 The Com-
missioner could resolve the judicial conflict by issuing regulations
defining the establishment of an additional geographical branch as
merely the expansion of an existing trade or business.
E. Doing Business Through Separate Entities
For a variety of legal and business reasons, corporations and
individuals often decide to do business through legal entities. A
chain of retail stores may decide to incorporate each of its stores as
a separate company. An individual entrepreneur may decide to in-
corporate a business or perhaps form a partnership with some other
individuals. Two or more companies may get together to form a
joint venture in the form of a corporation or a partnership. In de-
termining whether expenses incurred are start-up expenses or on-
going trade or business expenses, the prevailing rule is that each
separate entity is to be considered on its own. This rule can pro-
duce some anomalous results. For example, if a retail chain ex-
pands by opening a store in a new territory, then the start-up costs
would be deductible if the new store is not incorporated, but nonde-
ductible if the store is incorporated as a subsidiary.
A similar result occurs with partnerships. Courts have held
that partnerships are separate legal entities for purposes of deter-
mining if the requirement of carrying on of a trade or business is
met under section 162. This is troublesome since the definition of a
partnership under section 7701(a)(2) 90 is very broad. Thus, any
time two individuals get together to develop something for profit
there may be a partnership for tax purposes even if the individuals
have not formalized their relationship with a partnership agree-
ment. Deductible section 162 expenses can be converted into non-
deductible start-up expenditures if a relationship between
89. H.R. 96-1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 House
Report]. It is often difficult to distinguish between an expansion and the start of a new busi-
ness. See Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1978) (entry of residential real
estate developer into commercial real estate was an expansion and not entry into a new busi-
ness); York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1968) (entry of commercial and residen-
tial developer into industrial development was an expansion); and Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co. v. United States, 85 U.S.T.C. 9128 (Ct. Cl. 1985) (electric utility operating
fossil fuel plant entered new business by operating nuclear powered plant).
90. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business, fi-
nancial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the mean-
ing of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation.
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individuals or companies is considered to be a partnership. For ex-
ample, if two individual inventors who are both in the trade or busi-
ness of inventing get together to invent a product, their relationship
may be considered a partnership which is not carrying on a trade or
business because there is no history of inventing. Thus, the other-
wise deductible section 162 type expenditures of the partnership
may be treated as nondeductible start-up expenditures until a prod-
uct is developed and sold. This result may occur even if the ar-
rangement is not a partnership under legal concepts but is a
partnership under tax concepts. In such a case, the tax partnership
is considered a separate entity even if the partners are able to elect
out of partnership taxation treatment under the special rule of sec-
tion 761(a).
The leading case involving the treatment of partnerships as
separate entities for the purpose of determining whether a trade or
business has commenced is Madison Gas and Electric Co. v. Com-
missioner.91 In that case, MGE, a Wisconsin utility company, had
been selling gas and electricity since 1896. The power needs in
MGE's area were increasing and MGE decided to expand its capac-
ity by building a nuclear power plant in conjunction with two other
utilities. On February 2, 1967, MGE and two other utilities entered
into an agreement entitled, "Joint Power Supply Agreement,"
which called for the construction and ownership of a nuclear gener-
ating plant. The utilities were tenants in common, and were consid-
ered so by government regulating authorities. MGE owned a 17.8%
undivided interest in the project. For tax purposes, the utilities
elected out of partnership taxation treatment under subchapter K
by making an election-out under section 761(a).92 Electricity pro-
duced by the plant was to be distributed to each utility in propor-
tion to its ownership interest, and each utility was to use or sell its
portion of the power produced. Maintenance expenses were to be
paid in proportion to each utility's ownership interest.
91. 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'g 72 T.C. 521 (1979).
92. I.R.C. § 761(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Under regulations the Secretary may, at the election of all members of an unin-
corporated association, exclude such organization from the application of all or
part of this subchapter, if it is availed of-
(1) for investment purposes only and not for active conduct of a business,
(2) for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the
purpose of selling services or property produced or extracted, or
(3) by dealers in securities for a short period for the purpose of underwrit-
ing, selling, or distributing a particular issue of securities,
if the income of the members of the organization may be adequately deter-
mined without the computation of partnership taxable income.
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In 1969 and 1970, MGE incurred expenses relating to the nu-
clear training of employees, the establishment of internal proce-
dures and guidelines for plant operation, maintenance,
environmental activities, hiring, nuclear field management, and the
purchase of spare parts. Commercial operation of the plant began
after 1970.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the threshold
issue was whether MGE's arrangement with the other utilities con-
stituted a tax partnership. The Commissioner had conceded that if
the relationship was not a tax partnership, the expenses would be
deductible under section 162(a). MGE argued that a partnership
did not exist because there was no anticipated earning and sharing
of joint cash profits. The court disagreed, finding that all that was
required was a profit motive, which was satisfied here by the distri-
bution of electricity for sale at a profit.93
MGE contended that even if a partnership existed it should be
ignored because it lacked economic substance. The court replied as
follows:
Here MGE, WPS and WPL are engaged in the joint production
of electricity for resale, a joint venture for profit. Because they
were each already in the business of selling electricity, it can, of
course, be argued that the partnership venture itself is an exten-
sion or expansion of their existing businesses. It does not follow
from this though that we should ignore the partnership as lack-
ing economic substance. Such reasoning would lead to the
absurd conclusion that any partnership established to do collec-
tively what its participants formerly did individually or continue
to do individually outside the partnership lacks economic sub-
stance and should not be treated as a partnership for tax
purposes. 94
Madison Gas was followed in United States v Manor Care,
Inc. 91, which involved separate corporations established to own two
new homes in a nursing home chain. The court refused to ignore
the substance of these corporations with regard to the deductibility
of start-up expenses. The court rejected the taxpayers' argument
that the purpose of the consolidated return rules is to facilitate the
computation of the "business unit" in question, and that in keeping
with this goal the court should allow affiliated corporations to com-
pute their income as one business unit. The court found no author-
93. See also Bentex Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 565 (1953).
94. 633 F.2d at 517.
95. 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980).
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ity for creating a new exception to the general rules whenever an
affiliated group can show it operates as one business unit.
A similar result was obtained in Letter Ruling 8423005 where,
out of twenty-six new restaurants using the same name as the tax-
payer, two were incorporated for valid business reasons. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service allowed section 162 deductions for the pre-
opening expenditures of the unincorporated restaurants, but ruled
that the expenses of the incorporated restaurants were not deducti-
ble until the restaurants opened for business.96
Treating legal entities separately for determining start-up ex-
penses appears to be a sound tax doctrine, but it is clearly a trap for
the unwary entrepreneur. Thus, businesspersons involved in an
ongoing business should scrutinize their business relationships to
ensure they are not inadvertently creating a partnership which
would result in the disallowance of otherwise deductible expenses.
F. Research and Experimental Expenditures Incurred in
Connection with a Trade or Business
Congress has given favored treatment to research and experi-
mental start-up expenditures by allowing taxpayers to currently ex-
pense research costs. Section 174, added by the 1954 Code,
provides that a taxpayer may elect to expense research and experi-
mental expenditures incurred in connection with a trade or busi-
ness, or amortize them over a period of not less than sixty months.97
Prior to section 174, no specific treatment was provided for research
expenditures and they were often capitalized and amortized over
the useful life of the asset created. If there was no determinable
useful life, however, a taxpayer could deduct his costs only if a pro-
ject was abandoned or sold. Where projects were not abandoned or
sold, taxpayers had no means of obtaining a tax benefit for research
costs.
The regulations under section 174 define "research and experi-
mental" very broadly:
96. See also Bennet Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458 (1982), aft'd, 699 F.2d
450 (8th Cir. 1983).
97. Subsections (a)(1) and (2) of section 174 allow expense treatment to be adopted
without the Service's consent for the taxpayer's first taxable year in which research expendi-
tures are paid or incurred. Section 174(b) allows a taxpayer to elect to amortize research
expenditures over a period of not less than 60 months as selected by the taxpayer. The amor-
tization period begins with the month in which the taxpayer first realizes benefits from such
expenditures. Treas. Reg. § 1.174(a)(3) (1960) provides that, in the absence of a showing to
the contrary, the taxpayer will be deemed to have begun to realize benefits from the deferred
expenditures in the month in which the taxpayer first puts the process, formula or invention
or similar property to which the expenditures relate to an income producing use.
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The term "research or experimental expenditures", as used in
section 174 means expenditures incurred in connection with the
taxpayer's trade or business which represent costs in the experi-
mental or laboratory sense. The term includes generally all such
costs incident to the development of an experimental or pilot
model, a plant process, a product, a formula, an invention, or
similar property, and the improvement of already existing prop-
erty of the type mentioned. The term does not include expendi-
tures such as those for the ordinary testing or inspection of
materials or products for quality control or those for efficiency
surveys, management studies, consumer surveys, advertising, or
promotions. However, the term includes the cost of obtaining a
patent, such as attorney's fees expended in making and perfecting
a patent application.
98
Under these regulations, most forms of new product develop-
ment by high-technology companies would qualify as research and
experimental expenditures, and there has not been much contro-
versy in the courts as to what constitutes a research expenditure and
what does not. 9 9
The real controversy in this area has concerned start-ups and
whether or not research expenditures have been made "in connec-
tion with a trade or business." Until Snow v. Commissioner,"° ° the
courts and the IRS interpreted "in connection with his trade or
business" to have the same meaning as "carrying on any trade or
business." Thus, start-up companies were denied deductions until
they became ongoing concerns.
In Snow, the taxpayer was a four percent limited partner in
Burns, a partnership formed in 1966 to develop a special purpose
incinerator for consumer and industrial markets. The inventor of
the incinerator, Trott, was the general partner. Trott had conceived
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2 (1960). With regard to computer software development, Rev.
Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 states that the costs of developing software so closely resemble
the kind of research and experimental expenditures that fall within the purview of § 174 as to
warrant similar treatment.
99. In one of the few cases to find an absence of a qualifying activity, Mayrath v. Com-
missioner, 41 T.C. 582 (1964), the tax court held that the expenditures in connection with
building an "experimental" house in which the taxpayer resided were not research and exper-
imental expenditures within the meaning of the statute. The court found deductions should
be limited to those expenditures of an investigative nature involved in developing the concept
of a model or product, and doubted that the taxpayer's actual construction expenditures for a
"model" residence met the statutory requirements. Moreover, the court concluded that ap-
plication of the benefits of § 174 to a situation where a taxpayer seeks to deduct a portion of
the cost of an "experimental" house in which he and his family resided would plainly violate
the spirit and intent of the statute and produce an absurd result.
100. 416 U.S. 500.
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his idea in 1964 and had made a number of prototypes between
1964 and 1966. His patent counsel had advised him in 1965 that
several features of the burner were patentable, but in 1966 advised
him the invention was not sufficiently reduced to practice to develop
it into a marketable product. Thereafter, Trott formed Burns, put-
ting up part of the capital. Various models were then built and
tested. During 1966, Burns reported no sales of the incinerator or
of any other product but expectations were high. Trott was devot-
ing about one-third of his time to the project and was giving shop
work to an outside engineering firm. Trott obtained a patent on the
incinerator in 1970 and subsequently marketed it as a product.
The court found that section 174 was enacted to dilute the con-
cept of "ordinary and necessary" as used in section 162, and that by
adding "in connection with" into section 174, Congress intended to
make section 174 broader than section 162. In addition, the court
concluded that legislative history made it clear that Congress in-
tended to encourage small and pioneering firms to invest in develop-
ing new products and inventions, and to put these firms on an equal
footing with well-established competitors who have ongoing re-
search programs.'01 In holding that the taxpayer's 1966 expendi-
tures were deductible under section 174, the court stated:
Congress may at times in its wisdom discriminate tax-wise be-
tween various kinds of businesses, between old and oncoming
businesses and the like. But we would defeat the congressional
purpose somewhat to equalize the tax benefits of the ongoing
companies and those that are upcoming and about to reach the
market by perpetuating the discrimination created below and
urged upon us here. 102
While Snow indicates that section 174 adopts a more liberal
approach toward start-up companies, it is not clear just how far this
interpretation can be carried. Certain questions arise from the facts
of Snow itself. Snow involved a taxpayer who apparently had devel-
oped prototypes prior to the tax year in question. Should Trott's
activities be considered "in connection with a trade or business" in
1964 when he conceived of the idea, or in 1965 when he was build-
ing the prototypes and was told that his product had patentable
features?
The answer to these questions can best be determined by con-
sidering the basis upon which the court reached its decision. The
court based its decision on congressional intent to equalize the tax
101. Id. at 503-04.
102. Id
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treatment between existing firms and small or pioneering firms. On
this basis, there appears to be no reason to distinguish between vari-
ous categories of small and pioneering firms. That is, a pioneering
firm in the process of developing a prototype should be accorded the
same treatment as a pioneering firm that has developed a patentable
feature, which should be accorded the same treatment as a pioneer-
ing firm that is readying models for market.
Using this approach, section 174 should exclude research activ-
ities only where there is no profit motive or where the expectation of
success is so remote that one cannot reasonably connect the activity
with a profit motive. It is only in these cases that it can be said that
the research activities are not reasonably connected with a trade or
business. For example, in Maxwell v. Commissioner,103 the tax-
payer had inherited money and decided to pursue research in
marine biology. The taxpayer successfully spawned three different
marine species, but it was impossible to patent the techniques, and
development into a commercial activity was not foreseeable. The
tax court disallowed the taxpayer's research expenses because he
could not establish that the research was undertaken to generate
profit.
A potentially troublesome case concerning the trade or busi-
ness requirement is Green v. Commissioner,"° where the tax court
held that a partnership that purchased four unpatented inventions
and simultaneously resold them for a royalty based upon the future
sales of the developed products could not deduct payments made to
the transferee as research and development expenses. The tax court
held that the payments by the partnership were not in connection
with a trade or business, stating that the taxpayer must engage in a
trade or business at some time,1" 5 and that the partnership's activi-
ties consisted more of management of investments than of a trade or
business. The court concluded that section 174 was enacted to en-
courage small businesses to engage in research activities, not to cre-
ate tax deductions for passive investors. 10 6
While Green directly impacts research and development lim-
103. 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 504 (1982).
104. 83 T.C. 667 (1985).
105. Id. at 686 (emphasis in original).
106. The court stated:
An examination of LaSala's limited activity reveals that it functioned only as a
vehicle for injecting risk capital into the development and commercialization of
the four inventions. Its activities never surpassed those of an investor. It was
not the up-and-coming business which section 174 is intended to promote.
Id. at 687.
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ited partnerships and their investors, it also significantly affects
start-ups which often depend upon venture capital money that is
raised through such partnerships. It is unclear exactly how far the
Green decision will be carried by future courts, but it is very possi-
ble that it will turn out to be a case of limited scope as a result of its
unique facts. Most research and development partnerships differ,
from Green in at least two respects: 1) the partnership owns or
holds a license for the technology while it is under development,
and 2) it is possible at some time after the invention is reduced to a
marketable product that the partnership may find itself in the posi-
tion of having to market it. In Green there was no opportunity for
the partnership to become involved in the marketing of the products
resulting from the invention since the undeveloped inventions were
sold immediately upon their purchase by the partnership." 7
Taxpayers recently received a scare when, in a recent Techni-
cal Advice Memorandum, Letter Ruling 8409009,108 the Commis-
sioner applied the tax benefit rule to the sale of patents and know-
how, and required a taxpayer to include as ordinary income the
amount of deduction taken under section 174(a)(1) attributable to
the development of the patents and know-how, to the extent such
deductions resulted in a tax benefit. Any remaining proceeds were
to be treated as gains from the sale of a capital asset.
However, the Commissioner has since held in Revenue Ruling
85-186 that the tax benefit rule does not apply research and experi-
mental expenditures. 10 9
III. SECTION 195
Section 195 was enacted as part of the Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1980110 to provide an incentive for the formation of new
businesses. Congress was of a mind that the Richmond rule re-
flected the state of the law under section 162 and that some relief
was needed. Rather than change the Richmond rule, however, and
allow current deductions to start-up businesses, Congress provided
in section 195 that the type of expense disallowed under Richmond
could be amortized over a period selected by the taxpayer, but not
107. See Field, Restrictions on R & D Deductions Imposed by Recent Green Decision may
be Avoided, 62 J. TAX'N. 322 (1985).
108. Letter Rul. 8409009 was proposed by a General Counsel Memorandum G.C.M.
39162.
109. I.R.B. 1985-46, p. 6.
110. Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521 (1980) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 195
(1982)).
1986]
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
less than sixty months. The amortization period begins when the
taxpayer begins business.
Subsequent to the enactment of section 195, the tax court held
in Hoopengarner v. Commissioner111 that certain lease payments
made prior to the start of revenue generation were deductible under
section 212, and the court of claims in Blitzer held, contrary to
Richmond, that certain recurrent expenditures made prior to reve-
nue generation could qualify under section 162. Congress re-
sponded in the Tax Reform Act of 1984 by amending section 195 to
provide: 1) no start-up expenditures are deductible except as pro-
vided by section 195,112 2) the amortization period is to begin when
an active trade or business begins, rather than when "business be-
gins," '113 3) the Commissioner is to issue regulations as to when an
active trade or business begins,' 14 and 4) expenditures incurred for
the production of income in anticipation of beginning an active
trade or business are to be treated as start-up expenses.' 1 5 The 1984
General Explanation indicates that Congress intended to overrule
Blitzer 116, but that intention is not stated in any other prior com-
mittee report and is not clear from the amendments made to section
195.
Moreover, the 1984 General Explanation also indicates that
Congress did not intend to change the definition of start-up expend-
itures.117 Taken literally, this would mean that while Congress in-
tended to overrule the Blitzer case, it did not intend to change
existing law. This apparent inconsistency can best be explained or
rationalized by a closer analysis of section 195.
A. Nondeductibility of Start-Up Expenditures
Section 195(a) provides as follows:
(a) Capitalization of Expenditures - Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, no deduction shall be allowed for start-up
expenditures.
If an item is classified as a start-up expenditure under section
195, section 195(a) would prevent current deductibility and a tax-
111. 80 T.C. 538 (1983), afd, No. 83-7693 (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 1984) (unpublished
opinion).
112. I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984).
113. I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984).
114. I.R.C. § 195(c)(2)(A) (1984).
115. I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(iii) (1984).
116. General Explanation of the 1984 Act, supra note 4 at 296.
117. Id.
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payer could only obtain a tax benefit through amortization as pro-
vided in section 195(b). According to the legislative history, one of
the reasons for this provision is that Congress believed that start-up
expenditures generally result in the creation of an asset which ex-
tends substantially beyond the year incurred, and that such expend-
itures should not be fully deductible when paid or incurred but
rather should be deducted over a longer term. Consequently, be-
cause of the confusion under existing law as to the treatment of
start-up expenses, Congress intended to disallow deductions for all
start-up expenses (except those specifically excluded under section
195(c)(1)).118
Thus, the basis for nondeductibility under section 195(a) rests
on a legislative determination that start-up costs are capital in na-
ture, and not solely on the grounds that pre-opening expenses do
not meet the carrying on of a trade or business requirement of sec-
tion 162. Consequently, Congress has adopted a rule, similar to
that found in Idaho Power, for new businesses: All expenses in-
curred in building a new business must be capitalized even if the
useful life of any particular expenditure taken by itself would not
constitute a capital expenditure, e.g., an expenditure for monthly
utilities. 119
B. Start-Up Expenditures Defined
Another critical issue under' section 195 is the definition of a
start-up expenditure. Section 195(c)(1) defines start-up expendi-
tures as follows:
Start-Up Expenditures.-The term "start-up expenditure"
means any amount-
(A) paid or incurred in connection with -
(i) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active
trade or business, or
(ii) creating an active trade or business, or
(iii) any activity engaged in for profit and for the pro-
118. S. Print No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 282-83 (1984) [hereinafter cited as the 1984
Senate Print].
119. In review of the fact that a business is made up of a conglomeration of various assets
(for example, trained staff, know-how, trademarks, going concern value) may a taxpayer in
the start-up phase of a business take a § 165 loss deduction for assets abandoned during the
start-up process? For example, if a start-up fires its sales staff prior to making its first sale
because it has decided to use distributors, can it deduct the costs of developing such staff
§ 165? The availability of such deduction is unlikely as § 195(a) disallows any start-up de-
ductions, even those under § 165. This conclusion is reinforced by § 195(b)(2) which provides
that a § 165 deduction for unamortized start-up costs can be taken before the close of the
amortization period only if the business is completely disposed of.
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duction of income before the day on which the active
trade or business begins, in anticipation of such activity
becoming an active trade or business, and
(B) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the opera-
tion 120 of an existing trade or business (in the same field as the
trade or business referred to in subparagraph (A)), would be al-
lowable as a deduction for the taxable year in which paid or
incurred.
The term "start-up expenditure" does not include any amount
with respect to which a deduction is allowable under sections
163(a), 164, or 174.
In substance "start-up expenditures" must meet two require-
ments: 1) they must be paid or incurred in connection with creating
or acquiring a trade or business, and 2) they must be the type of
expenditures which would be deductible to an existing business.
Expenditures which would be capital expenditures for an existing
business would not be start-up expenditures. Such "non-start-up"
expenditures would apparently be charged to the asset created, and,
if a determinable useful life exists, would be eligible for amortiza-
tion or depreciation at the time business begins and such assets are
placed in service. If such assets are abandoned prior to the start of
an active trade or business, a loss deduction would apparently be
available under section 165.
The statute does not define the period during which an expen-
diture must be incurred to qualify as a start-up expenditure. Ac-
cording to the legislative history, however, start-up expenditures are
costs incurred subsequent to a decision to acquire or establish a par-
ticular business and prior to its actual operation. 121 Moreover, the
1980 House Report provides the following instruction:
Under the provision, eligible expenses consist of investigatory
costs incurred in reviewing a prospective business prior to reach-
ing a final decision to acquire or enter that business. These costs
include expenses incurred for the analysis or survey of potential
markets, products, labor supply, transportation facilities, etc. El-
igible expenditures also include start-up costs which are incurred
subsequent to a decision to establish a particular business and
120. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended the prior version of § 195 to substitute the
word "operation" for the word "expansion." Thus, under the prior version of § 195, an ex-
penditure was a start-up expenditure only if it would be deductible in connection with the
expansion of an existing trade or business. The General Explanation of the 1984 Act states
that now: "Under the Act, start-up costs include such expenses if paid or incurred in connec-
tion with the operation as well as the expansion of an existing trade or business." General
Explanation of the 1984 Act, supra note 4 at 296-97.
121. 1980 House Report, supra note 89 at 10.
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prior to the time when the business begins. For example, start-
up costs include advertising, salaries and wages paid to employ-
ees who are being trained and their instructors, travel and other
expenses incurred in lining up potential distributors, suppliers, or
fees paid or incurred for executives, consultants, and for similar
professional services. 22
Thus, general investigative expenses incurred prior to choosing
a particular business would not be deductible, and would be subject
to the existing rules discussed in Part III. B. above. Moreover, if a
taxpayer makes investigations of multiple businesses before choos-
ing a particular one, these expenditures would not qualify as start-
up expenditures. Such investigatory expenditures are ultimately de-
ductible only if they can be added to the basis of a business which is
entered into and such business is subsequently abandoned or
sold.123
Expenditures for research, interest and taxes are specifically ex-
cluded from the definition of start-up expenditures and are deducti-
ble in accordance with sections 174, 163 and 164.
C. The Hoopengarner Amendment
In Hoopengarner v. Commissioner,24 a taxpayer held a lease-
hold on undeveloped land and paid rent on the leasehold prior to
constructing and leasing an office building. The tax court found
that the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business under sec-
tion 162 prior to leasing the building but that the rent paid on the
leasehold was deductible under section 212. The court held that
under section 212, a taxpayer does not have to meet the trade or
business requirement, but only the express requirements of section
212, namely: 1) ownership of a possessory interest; 2) the interest
must be held for the production of income, and 3) the expenditures
must not be capital in nature. The court concluded that the second
requirement was met even though the property did not generate any
current income because section 212 does not require current re-
turns. The third requirement was deemed met because the tax-
payer's rent payments did not create a benefit that extended beyond
the taxable year.
This decision was seen as an inappropriate means of circum-
venting the Richmond rule, and was quickly dealt with by Congress
in the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Section 195(c)(1)(A)(iii) includes
122. Id.
123. See supra Part III. B.
124. See supra note 115.
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as a start-up expenditure any expenditure incurred in an activity for
profit and for the production of income before and in anticipation of
the activity becoming an active trade or business. Consequently,
the type of expenses incurred in Hoopengarner are now non-deduct-
ible under section 212 and are subject to amortization under section
195(b). 125
D. The Active Trade or Business Requirement
If expenditures relate to creating a trade or business, the busi-
ness must be an active trade or business within the meaning of sec-
tion 162 in order for the expenditures to qualify as start-up
expenditures. Expenditures attributable to investment activities do
not qualify. In the case of rental activities, there must be a signifi-
cant furnishing of services incident to the rentals to constitute an
active trade or business rather than an investment.1 26 However, the
1984 Senate Report states that the definition of active trade or busi-
ness may include a trade or business that is in many respects pas-
sive. For example, a business where property is regularly leased on
a net lease basis may be considered an active trade or business.127
E. Acquisition of an Active Trade or Business
Investigatory expenditures incurred with respect to the acquisi-
tion of a trade or business will be considered start-up expenditures
under section 195(c)(1) only if the taxpayer has an equity interest
and participates in the management of the trade or business. 128 A
taxpayer will not be considered to have a qualifying interest with
respect to bond investments or other debt instruments (even if con-
vertible), preferred stock, or a limited partnership interest.129 A
sole proprietor will always be considered to have an operator equity
interest in the trade or business. 130 The acquisition of common
stock will generally be considered as the acquisition of an invest-
ment interest. However, if the transaction in substance is the acqui-
sition of the assets of a trade or business, e.g., through a liquidation,
then the investigatory expenses are eligible for amortization. In ad-
125. See Note, Hoopengarner v. Commissioner Revisited: Does the Tax Reform Act of
1984 Solve the Pre-Opening Expense Problem?, 4 VA. TAX REV. 141 (1984).
126. See 1980 House Report, supra note 89 at 11. The House Report also indicates that
an activity with respect to which expenses are deductible only as itemized deductions for
individuals under section 212 is not considered to be a trade or business.
127. See 1984 Senate Print, supra note 121 at 283.
128. See 1980 House Report, supra note 89 at 11-12.
129. Id.
130. Id.
[Vol. 2
DEDUCTING START-UP EXPENDITURES
dition, a corporate taxpayer will be considered to have acquired the
trade or business assets of an acquired corporation if the acquired
corporation becomes a member of an affiliated group which in-
cludes the taxpayer and a consolidated return is filed for such
group.1 31 In the case of a general partnership interest, the taxpayer
will be considered to have acquired an interest if the taxpayer ac-
tively participates in the management of the trade or business. 132
F. Election to Amortize
Section 195(b)(1) provides that start-up expenditures may, at
the election of the taxpayer, be treated as deferred expenses to be
allowed as a deduction prorated equally over a period of not less
than sixty months as may be selected by the taxpayer. The amorti-
zation period begins with the month the active trade or business
begins. Since the minimum amortization period is sixty months, the
legislative history indicates that the election is inapplicable to busi-
nesses which have an ascertainable useful life of less than sixty
months. Expenditures relating to such businesses remain subject to
existing law.133 In the case of an amount subject to amortization
but which is unamortized upon the termination of the trade or busi-
ness, a taxpayer may deduct any unamortized amount as a loss
under section 162, or an unamortized amount might be carried over
to the taxpayer's successor in interest. 134
Elections may not be made later than the time for filing the
return (including extensions) for the taxable year in which the trade
or business begins.1 3' Elections may not be made conditional, and
once an amortization period is selected, it may not be changed. To
make the election, the taxpayer must attach a statement to the re-
turn for the tax year in which the amortization period begins. The
statement must include the description and amount of the expendi-
tures involved, the date the expenditures were incurred, the month
in which the taxpayer began or acquired the business, and the
number of months of the amortization period.1 36
Elections under section 195(b)(1) will cause trying decisions
131. Id. Compare the treatment of a separate corporation in the context of attributing
the activities of an affiliated corporation to the start-up corporation for the purposes of deter-
mining whether the start-up corporation is incurring start-up expenditures. See Part III. E.,
supra.
132. See 1980 House Report, supra note 89 at 12.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. See Rev. Rul. 70-241, 1970-1 C.B. 84.
135. I.R.C. § 195(d)(1) (1984).
136. Announcement 81-43, I.R.B. 1981-11, 52.
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for taxpayers. If a taxpayer misjudges when the business begins, the
taxpayer may file the election in the wrong year and fail to make a
proper election. In addition, section 195 may produce a situation
where the Commissioner and the taxpayer reverse roles: the Com-
missioner may claim a business began prior to the year stated by the
taxpayer on his election statement in order to invalidate the elec-
tion. The election requirements put a premium on good record
keeping. If the taxpayer misses any start-up expenditures in his
election statement, he may not be able to amortize them if they are
subsequently discovered. A similar position is taken by the Com-
missioner with regard to trademark and trade name expenses amor-
tized under section 177.137
G. When Does an Active Trade or Business Begin?
Section 195(c)(2) provides that the determination of when an
active trade or business begins shall be made in accordance with the
regulations prescribed by the Commissioner. An acquired active
trade or business shall be treated as beginning when the taxpayer
acquires it. As of the date of this writing, the Commissioner has not
issued any regulations under section 195.
The date on which an active trade or business begins is clearly
the most important issue for a start-up. That date determines
whether an expenditure is a start-up expenditure or whether it is
not. Expenditures incurred after an active trade or business begins
are subject to the general rules of the Code. In addition, the period
for amortizing start-up expenditures begins at the time an active
trade or business begins. The statute itself gives no help in provid-
ing a demarcation line, as it delegates this job to the Commissioner
and, without the help of the regulations, one must look at the legis-
lative history and existing precedent to determine what the rule
should be.
The legislative history of the 1984 amendments fails to cite any
judicial authority or statutory language as to when an active trade
or business begins. The 1984 Senate Report states: "An active trade
or business means the taxpayer is actively conducting a trade or
business." 13 8 This circular definition is of little aid in determining
when an active trade or business begins.
The term "active" when used in connection with a trade or
137. Rev. Rut. 75-333, 1975-2 C.B. 110.
138. See General Explanation of the 1984 Act, supra note 4 at 296.
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business is generally used to distinguish a passive from an active
business. The 1984 Senate Report provides:
Active trade or business means that the taxpayer is actively con-
ducting a trade or business. This definition of active trade or
business may include a trade or business that is in many respects
passive. For example, a business where property is regularly
based (sic) on a net lease basis is an active trade or business for
this purpose.
1 39
This statement can be read several ways, but it appears most
consistent as describing the type of business, i.e., passive versus ac-
tive, rather than the level of activity a business must reach before it
passes from the start-up phase.
The only judicial references in the legislative history are to
Hoopengarner, Blitzer, and Brotherman,14 cases which are cited in
the 1984 General Explanation:
Under the Act, the definition of start-up expenditures is generally
the same as under prior law. However the Act modified the defi-
nition in two respects. First, the definition of start-up expendi-
tures is broadened to include any expenditures made with respect
to any activity engaged in for profit or for the production of in-
come before the day on which the active trade or business begins,
in anticipation of such activity becoming an active trade or busi-
ness. For example, Congress intended that the rent expenses per-
mitted as a deduction in the Hoopengarner case will be subject to
this provision. Likewise, Congress intended that the expenses
that were permitted as deductions in cases such as Blitzer... and
Brotherman ... would be subject to this provision. 14 1
Both Hoopengarner and Blitzer arose from real estate construc-
tion projects, but Hoopengarner involved section 212 which does
not have a trade or business requirement. Thus, Hoopengarner
would appear to be of no value in determining when Congress in-
tended a trade or business to begin. The Blitzer court found that
the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business prior to finishing
construction of its project but disallowed any deductions for lack of
proof. In Brotherman, the taxpayer owned an unlicensed cable sys-
tem and was awaiting approval from the FCC to begin operations.
Based on Blitzer, the court of claims allowed expenses incurred
prior to the approval of the FCC license, and specifically did not
follow Richmond.
139. Id.
140. 54 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 84-5394 (Ct. Cl. 1984).
141. General Explanation of the 1984 Act, supra note 4 at 296.
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It would appear from its references to Blitzer and Brotherman
that Congress meant to reject the possibility of obtaining a deduc-
tion prior to a business being ready to generate revenue. But
whereas there is express statutory language to deal with the
Hoopengarner situation under section 195(c)(1)(A)(iii), no statutory
language specifically overrules Blitzer. The only statutory reference
to Blitzer is in the 1984 General Explanation.142 There is no refer-
ence to Blitzer in either the Senate Finance or Conference Commit-
tee reports.
Nonetheless, a change in language between the prior version of
section 195 and the amended version of section 195 may support the
overruling of Blitzer. Under the prior version, amortization began
when the "business begins," whereas under the amended version
amortization begins when the "active trade or business begins."
However, as previously mentioned, the word "active" appears only
to differentiate between an active and a passive business and does
not refer to the time a business begins, or to the stage of develop-
ment of a business.
Prior to the 1984 amendments, section 195 amortization began
at the time the "business begins" and the House Report stated that
it was anticipated that rules would be formulated that would be
similar to the rules under sections 248 and 709.143 Under these
rules a business is considered to "begin business" when activities
have advanced to the stage necessary to establish the nature of its
business operations.144
The legislative history of the 1984 amendments state that there
was no intention to change the definition of start-up expenses. As
there is no language (other than the Hoopengarner amendment) that
would indicate a change in prior law, and since the reports of the
two legislative committees involved in the process of amending sec-
tion 195 did not mention Blitzer, consideration has to be given to
whether the reference to Blitzer in the 1984 General Explanation
has any validity. The paragraph (as quoted above) begins by stating
that the definition of start-up expenses is to be the same as under
prior law, and that it is to be broadened to include the Hoopen-
garner case (support for which exists in express statutory lan-
guage). The statement then concludes that, "likewise," Congress
intends Blitzer and Brotherman to be overruled. These statements
concerning Blitzer and Brotherman appear to be afterthoughts on
142. Id.
143. 1980 House Report, supra note 89 at 13.
144. See supra Part III. C.
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the part of the writers of the 1984 General Explanation and are not
representative of legislative intent.145 The Commissioner must now
decide where to draw the line.
V. CONCLUSION
In his book "The Road to Colossus,"146 Thomas Kiernan de-
scribes the career of Samuel Morse, who started out as a portrait
painter and eventually invented the telegraph and the Morse Code.
Morse was an American residing in England in 1831 when Michael
Faraday discovered that an electric current could be produced in
metal by changing the metal's magnetic intensity. Morse wrote to
Benjamin Silliman, a scientist at Yale, of the discovery, comment-
ing, "Wouldn't it be a thing of marvel if Mr. Faraday's current
could be employed to send these words to you through magnetized
wire, in some form of electrical impulses, so that it might reach you
more quickly than I daresay they will? Farfetched, no doubt."
Silliman wrote back to Morse that his idea was not farfetched
and, thereafter, on his trip back to America in 1832, Morse devel-
oped the famous Morse Code. Back in the United States, he began
to work on the idea by acquainting himself with the leading scien-
tists in the field of electricity and by learning as much as he could
about electricity. He met with Joseph Henry, of Renssalaer, in
Troy, New York in 1833 who told him that the idea was practical
and gave him valuable information as to how to build a transmitting
device.
Morse returned to New York City, gave up portrait painting
and took a job teaching art at the University of the City of New
York, primarily so that he could use the university's laboratory.
With the help of a science teacher, Morse built a device that was
able to transmit pulsations over a short length of wire. However,
after consultation with Henry, Morse learned how to increase the
length of transmission with the use of relays. Then, in 1835, Morse
began construction of a receiving device which would convert the
electrical impulses into mechanical signals. In 1836, he developed a
receiving device that produced the famous clicking of the telegraph.
145. In considering the effect of the General Explanation of the 1984 Act, the Service
should keep in mind the regulations under section 6661 which deals with penalties for sub-
stantial understatement of tax liability. Specifically, Treasury Regulation section 1.6661-
3(b)(2) (1985), states that descriptions of statutes prepared after the enactment of a statute
(such as General Explanations) are not authority for purposes of determining whether a tax-
payer has substantial authority for taking a particular position on his tax return.
146. T. KIERNAN, THE ROAD TO COLOSSUS, 105-12 (1985). This book provides an ex-
cellent history of America's industrial revolution.
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The device was first publicly demonstrated in 1839, but was
met by a lack of enthusiasm and no offers of financial backing re-
sulted. At this time, Morse was both terribly discouraged and poor,
and did not bother to apply for a patent. Nevertheless, he contin-
ued to work on improvements to his telegraph. Morse was repeat-
edly rejected in his attempts to obtain financing, however, and it
was not until 1843 that he managed to obtain $30,000 from Con-
gress for a long-distance test of his device. In 1844, a wire was
placed between Washington and Baltimore, and Morse proved that
his invention worked. But it was not until 1855 that AT&T was
formed to operate lines in the East, and not until 1856 that Western
Union was formed to operate lines in the West.
Thus, it took Samuel Morse more than thirteen years from the
time he developed his initial concept until the time he was able to
show the world that it worked, and it was not until some time after-
ward that he began to profit from his years of devotion and work.
The story of Samuel Morse is important because it reflects the
way things happen in the United States. A person develops an idea,
becomes obsessed with bringing it to fruition, and the public bene-
fits when that person succeeds. The repetition of this story through-
out history has made America as great as it is today.
In this context, when one looks at the tax policy that has devel-
oped over the past twenty years, one wonders whether the propo-
nents of this policy desire to continue to foster the development of
new ideas and products. If the Commissioner adopts the Richmond
rule in the regulations under section 195, then people like Samuel
Morse, and the investors behind them, would not obtain section 162
deductions until the product is completed, demonstrated, and out in
the world generating revenue. Moreover, in order to amortize their
pre-opening expenses, they would have to be sure to meet IRS rec-
ord keeping requirements. Morse would have been required to keep
records of all of his expenses, beginning in 1831 and continuing for
a period of thirteen years. Samuel Morse's project almost died be-
cause he could not obtain private financing. Only when the federal
government gave him a subsidy could he continue. We should not
make it harder for our entrepreneurs; their task is difficult enough,
and only few succeed. The failure to obtain current deductions for
operating expenses can mean the difference between obtaining fi-
nancing and not obtaining financing: the difference between success
and failure.
Therefore, what should the Commissioner do when preparing
the regulations under section 195 and determining when an active
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trade or business begins? The Commissioner should take a look at
existing regulations under section 183, which treat a serious inves-
tor as being engaged in a trade or business, and should adopt such
an approach for section 195. There is nothing in the legislative his-
tory which would prevent the Commissioner from adopting this
view. The section 183 regulations were in existence when the
amendments to section 195 were enacted by the Tax Reform Act of
1984, and such regulations were not overruled.
For reasons previously discussed in this article, the reference to
the decision in Blitzer and Brotherman in the 1984 General Expla-
nation to section 195 should not affect the Commissioner's treat-
ment of high-technology start-ups. Using the section 183
regulations and the regulations under sections 248 and 709, the
Commissioner can fulfill the congressional mandate under section
195 for high-technology by providing that an active trade or busi-
ness begins where: 1) the taxpayer has engaged in research that
would qualify as research as defined under section 174; 2) the tax-
payer is seriously carrying on such research as indicated by the ex-
penditure of significant sums of money or a significant amount of
time; and 3) there is a reasonable expectation that the idea, once
developed into a product, would represent a saleable product that
would lead to a profit making business.
The Commissioner should adopt a liberal attitude towards
high-technology start-ups. Failure to adopt such a policy can only
lead to a decline in the development of high-technology industry in
the United States.
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